Abstract: This article addresses two questions about the EU's and EU member states' diplomacy in the UN General Assembly's Third Committee and the Human Rights Council: Have EU member states been more, or less, active outside the framework of EU coordination since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty? Has EU activity increased? The findings are that EU member states have been increasingly active at the Human Rights Council and have increasingly worked with other states outside of the EU, while the level of EU activity has remained largely the same. In the Third Committee, member states speak more than the EU but neither the EU or member states have been sponsoring more resolutions. Europeanisation is 'arrested' in these cases, as member states are reluctant to push for more EU activity because both the internal intergovernmental decision-making system and external context discourage it.
the EU's capacity to exercise influence in international affairs, including of course at the UN. Recent research, however, has illustrated that tensions persist between the strengthening of institutions and expectations for EU foreign policy-making, and member states' continuing desire for autonomy in foreign affairs (Balfour, Carta and Raik 2015a; Spence and Bátora 2015) . 'Output' here encompasses two types of activity: sponsorship of resolutions and issuing of statements. 'EU activity' means activity that is done in the name of the EU (whether this is carried out by the presidency or the EU delegation), and 'member state activity' covers that done in the name of an EU member state. 'Convergence' is understood here to entail more EU, and less member state, activity: a process whereby the member states increasingly pursue (upload) their policy objectives in UN human rights fora through the EU. Of course, member state activity could align with that of the EU: indeed, member states often support EU positions in their own statements. 'One message spoken by many voices' may indicate convergence on substance. But member states usually add a 'national twist' in their statements -or ignore the EU altogether -which can cloud perceptions of EU unity amongst the wider UN membership, and undermine the EU's message.
The article compares the activities of the EU and the EU member states in the Human Rights Council (HRC) and the UN General Assembly's Third Committee, two bodies where the Lisbon Treaty has been implemented to a different extent. Several puzzles are uncovered: in the HRC, the EU has not become more active, while EU member states have increasingly acted outside the EU framework; at the Third Committee, EU and member state activity is similar in terms of sponsoring resolutions though member states speak much more than they did in the pre-Lisbon period, and more than the EU does.
The data on EU and member state activity is readily available in the official records of the Human Rights Council and Third Committee. 3 The analysis of the data is based on interview material spanning more than a decade: interviews with over twenty diplomats and human rights activists conducted in Geneva, New York and London in 2014 and Brussels in 2016, as well as interviews conducted with almost thirty diplomats involved in EU-UN relations between 2003 and 2010, in Brussels, Geneva, London and New York. They were asked a series of questions about the EU coordination process, their state's role in the coordination process and UN human rights fora in general, and the diplomatic dynamics within the Third Committee and HRC. 4 The first section of this article summarises the changes that have been made in the EU's coordination and representation functions at the UN, and introduces the key questions addressed in the article. The second section presents the findings of the empirical investigation. The third section seeks to explain the findings.
Implications of the Lisbon Treaty for EU coordination and representation at the UN
Before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the presidency chaired coordination meetings in New York and Geneva, and the Council working group on human rights (COHOM) in Brussels. COHOM did advance work on the resolutions and statements that the EU would present in the UN, though most of the details of those texts were decided in coordination meetings in New York or Geneva, as were any arrangements to convince non-EU states to support EU initiatives. Because COHOM met only once a month and had numerous other items on its agenda, it was not the first 'port of call' if the member states had difficulties in reaching agreement on details, so member state diplomats referred back to their capitals and then tried to work out solutions on the ground in New York or Geneva (Smith 2006, p. 102 Wouters and Meuwissen, 2013, pp. 14-19) . Moreover, since 2012, the Foreign Affairs Council annually has set out a list of priorities for the EU in UN human rights fora (Council of the European Union 2012a , 2012b , 2013 , 2014 , 2016 . COHOM decides and drafts the resolutions that the EU presents in UN human rights fora, in cooperation with EU delegations in New York and Geneva. There are now two COHOM formations, one consisting of member state experts based in Brussels, and the other consisting of experts from the member states' capitals. The latter is responsible for coordinating EU policy in UN human rights fora. Over the past few years, COHOM has met much more frequently than it did before (Baranowska et al, 2014, pp 48-50; Wouters and Meuwissen 2013, p. 15) , including occasionally in Geneva. The details of the texts of EU resolutions or statements, the strategy for engaging with other UN states, and other such matters are still decided on the ground in New York or Geneva, but here too there has been centralisation. In both locations, a new EU delegation, part of the EEAS, took over the chairing of EU coordination meetings in 2010.
The question of who would present the EU's positions in the UN -the EU delegation or the EU presidency -proved to be highly contentious (Guimaraes 2014; Laatikainen 2015 
Resolutions
The main activity in both bodies is the debating of resolutions on human rights issues. Although these are non-binding, debates on many resolutions -such as those related to particular countries, or to topics such as discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation -can be intense. HRC resolutions can enable fact-finding missions by 'special procedures' (experts) or commissions of inquiries, which have at least the potential to influence public debate or even developments on the ground. While the impact of the resolutions on the actual protection of human rights may be doubted (see, for example, Hafner-Burton, 2013, pp. 68-9, 129, and 195-96) , states are trying to set or enforce standards through a process of 'collective legitimisation', or gaining the approval of most or all of the UN member states (Claude 1966, p. 370 ).
The HRC debates about twice as many resolutions than does the Third Committee (around 100 versus 40 or so), a result partly due to the longer time it is in session each year, and partly due to its role as the premier intergovernmental body on human rights in the UN system, though there has been concern about the growth in the number of resolutions presented there. In 2015, the total number of resolutions contracted for the first time, to 95, the lowest in five years (yourHRC.org, 2015) . Most diplomatic activity regarding international human rights is focused on the HRC, but New
York is an important site for collective legitimisation by the entire UN membership. introduced by the EU and by EU member states on their own, over a period of twelve years, with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in the middle. It should first be noted that member states have 5 Human rights questions dominate the Third Committee's agenda, but it also considers issues relating to social development, crime prevention and cultural heritage. This article only analyses action with respect to human rights issues. 6 To give a fuller picture of the decade of EU activity, the data includes resolutions presented at the HRC's predecessor, the Commission on Human Rights, in its last two years of functioning. The CHR met only once a year for six weeks and had 53 members. There are enough continuities to justify including data from the CHR in 2004 and 2005: notably, many of the same resolutions that were run at the CHR have been run at the HRC.
long sponsored resolutions on a national basis. What is of interest here is whether member states are increasingly seeking to upload their preferences for resolutions to the EU level, and whether the EU is increasingly active as a result. (Laatikainen 2003; Laatikainen 2015) , and the Francophonie had almost never been active in the UN on human rights issues. But now there is coordination within both groups.
The EU has been relatively more active at the HRC in requesting special sessions to be held on urgent human rights issues. Through December 2015, 24 special sessions have been called; the EU has called for six of them (three of which were on human rights in Syria). EU member states have also requested three special sessions, but on these occasions all of the EU member states serving on the HRC did so.
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Statements
The activity of speaking in the HRC or Third Committee entails giving statements on draft resolutions and during panel discussions and interactive dialogues with 'special procedures'. Figures 3 and 4 provide information on the extent to which the EU speaks on behalf of the member states, and member states speak on a national basis. EU statements here include statements given by the EU delegation, or by the presidency or another member state in the EU's name. Statements by EU member states can (and often do) back up the EU's position, but usually add something 'national' or not even refer to the EU at all, so convergence is not clear-cut, and to the wider UN membership, the EU may not appear unified.
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Given the large quantity of statements, Figures 3 and 4 give an idea of trends. Figure 3 reports the statements in the Third Committee debates on two agenda items: 'human rights questions, including alternative approaches for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms', and 'human rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives'. A large proportion of the resolutions debated in the Third Committee (including the most controversial ones) fall under these items. 13 Figure 4 reports the number of statements given in the September session at the HRC each year. For example, in the Third Committee sessions considered here, Greece and Cyprus make statements every year on the Turkey-Cyprus dispute. 13 The figure includes statements given only in the general debates, not in the sessions during which proposals were considered, as this would overlap with figures on resolutions presented. The debates usually take place over 7 or 8 days, and both agenda items are covered at the same time. 14 It does not include any activity with respect to the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), a process by which the human rights records of all UN member states are assessed by Human Right Council members. The EU engages in hardly any coordination on the UPR. 15 No data is included for 2012 as numerous UN meetings were cancelled due to Hurricane Sandy.
Source: Summary Records of each meeting, available on UNBISnet. Committee has also grown faster than the number of EU statements, and more member states are speaking during debates on the two agenda items.
2. The level of activity of the EU in terms of resolutions has remained largely the same in both the HRC and the Third Committee, while the number of EU statements has been steady at the HRC and increased somewhat in the Third Committee.
Intergovernmentalists might object that these findings are not a puzzle, as they simply reflect national preferences, though as explicated below, the interesting questions are why the member state prefer not to boost EU activity (despite agreeing to institutional reforms in the Lisbon Treaty) and why they have been increasingly acting outside the EU particularly in the HRC context. The findings are a puzzle if we assume that the processes of institutionalisation and/or socialisation lead to both greater EU activity over time and the Europeanisation of member states' diplomatic activity, notably in the form of uploading preferences to the EU level. Higher EU activity and concomitant lower levels of member state activity indicate a process of convergence fostered by the new institutions and procedures of the Lisbon Treaty Hill and Wong 2011 ). This in turn could be the result of rationalist cost-benefit calculations, in which EU member states consider it beneficial to use more efficient EU institutions to pursue common positions and activities, and curtail their own diplomatic efforts as a result, instead uploading their preferences to the EU level.
More efficient central institutions could help states to achieve their preferences and exercise influence. Or increased EU activity could be the result of socialisation, as EU member states increasingly come to see EU action as desirable and consider it appropriate for EU institutions to take a leading role, and therefore conduct more of their foreign policy activity through the EU.
The findings confirm trends that have recently been noticed or predicted elsewhere. As Christian Lequesne noted, 'In European integration, the institutionalization of any policy produces simultaneously convergence and resistance from the member states' (Lequesne 2015, p. 54; see also Saurugger and Terpan, 2015) , though he argued such resistance in the foreign policy area comes primarily from large member states (as seen above, small and large member states have acted outside the EU in the HRC). Balfour, Carta and Raik concluded that EU member states still can choose to address international challenges through the EU or outside it (Balfour, Carta and Raik 2015b, p. 198 This article thus seeks to explain not just the stability in EU activity but the increase in member state activity in the HRC in particular. 16 The lack of innovation is apparent at the top of the EU machinery. EU priorities in UN human rights fora have even become less specific about what the EU will do (Council of the European Union 2012a , 2013 , 2014 , 2016 . The Council documents for 2012 and 2013 list numerous human rights issues about which the EU is concerned and also indicate that the EU will present resolutions on some of those issues (the usual resolutions noted above); the documents for 2014, 2015 and 2016 do not indicate that the EU will present resolutions on any of them. In none of the documents is it clear how the EU will express its concern (in a statement? during an interactive debate? by working with other UN states?).
The Foreign Affairs Council (and COHOM below it) has thus neither set out a clear strategy for EU activity in UN human rights fora, nor indicated that the EU will be initiating any new activity.
Interviews and other accounts indicate that since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, COHOM and the EU delegations have been 'overloaded'. Even though COHOM has split its work into two formations, and meets more often, it has still struggled to handle the workload (Baranowska et al, 2014, p. 119) . Interviews indicated that the EU delegations in New York and Geneva have experienced constraints just trying to take over the role that the presidency used to play (as the example of the Syria resolution, above, illustrates). Thus the central EU institutions have been unable to do much more than handle 'inherited' statements and resolutions. Although burdensharing between the EU delegation and member states exists in New York and Geneva, it is not systematic and depends on member states volunteering to help (Laatikainen 2015; Spence 2015) . 16 The new member states did not contribute much to the increase in either UN forum. In the Third Committee, Bulgaria issued 2 statements in 2014, Croatia one in 2014 and Romania one in 2013, and none have sponsored resolutions. In the HRC, Bulgaria and Croatia speak rarely, if at all, though Romania does (up to 9 times in 2011, but less so in other years), Bulgaria has not sponsored a resolution, while Croatia and Romania have participated in groups that have introduced resolutions, but always with other EU member states.
Geneva is particularly difficult, because the HRC is almost always in session. As one interviewee put it, the EU struggles to 'gear up' for the constant engagement on human rights in Geneva.
Why do the member states appear reluctant to support collective EU activity and to provide more dynamism by uploading their preferences to the EU level? Interviews indicate a mixture of familiar reasons (constant over the past decade) and new ones. First of all, the intergovernmental nature of decision-making in the EU is a crucial and well-known factor. The process of reaching consensus within the EU can be slow, laborious or impossible if one or more member states blocks a group position. The need for consensus can either inhibit collective action entirely or water it down.
Coordinating twenty-eight member states' views takes time; on fast-moving issues, member states may prefer to work nationally or in other groups in order to ensure their policy preferences are met.
Three examples illustrate the impact of intergovernmental decision-making. Germany could not upload its preference regarding privacy in a digital age to the EU level because the EU is divided on privacy issues, with the UK in particular opposing Germany. France has worked with African states on issues relating to the Sahel, partly because its preferences are not completely shared within the EU and partly because the Sahel situation developed quickly and the EU could not act as rapidly as a looser cross-regional grouping could. Nordic Group members prefer to work together on issues such as women's rights where their preferences are stronger than the EU consensus.
The constraints of intergovernmental decision-making alone do not explain the findings. As is increasingly argued in the literature on EU performance in international institutions, the external context matters enormously (see Gutner and Thompson 2013; Oberthür and Groen 2015) . In this case, the internal and external contexts have interacted in a way that inhibits EU activity. The Third Committee and HRC have traditionally been dominated by 'group politics', with formal regional and political groups opposing each other. In particular, the African Group and the EU tend to clash in the Third Committee, over numerous issues. There is only some of the cross-regional cooperation that is now seen in the Human Rights Council. The HRC was also polarised, and the EU was often pitted against the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and/or the African Group (see Gowan and Brantner, 2008; Gowan and Brantner 2010; Wouters and Meuwissen 2013, p. 5) .
Despite the fact that reaching intergovernmental agreement on EU activity is challenging, in Geneva and in New York the EU is the most resourced group, able to stake out positions on virtually all of the topics under discussion (except where EU member states disagree). Some interviewees indicated that because the EU acts in such a unified way, other states are 'forced' to act in regional and political groups to try to protect and advance their own preferences. EU activity almost The EU has thus struggled to exercise influence in UN human rights bodies. In the past, when it has been unsuccessful in gathering support for its resolutions, it has generally dropped them (Smith 2010 the freedom of opinion, by inviting one country from each region to join a 'core group'; this split the regional and political blocs. Since then, attempts to build cross-regional core groups have spread.
Many are led by the 'moderates' or 'bridge-builders' in the groups, such as Botswana, Chile, Mexico, Jordan, and some EU member states, in particular Austria. The strategy appears to be working, in that cross-regional groups are perceived to be the most promising way to push forward initiatives, even though the context is still considered to be polarised (see yourHRC.org 2015).
EU member states have been active in cross-regional groups. They have concluded that the costs of working together as the EU in the HRC outweigh the benefits of working in cross-regional or other groups outside the EU framework. As one interviewee noted, initiatives taken in cross-regional groups are weaker than they would be if taken by the EU, as the EU is a group of like-minded states, and the cross-regional groups are not as homogenous. (A preference for Nordic Group over EU collaboration mirrors this on a smaller scale and shows a strong preference for principled stances by Nordic Group members.) But opposition to the EU obliterates that advantage: better to reach a weaker agreement that could be successful in the HRC than a stronger agreement that will be rejected. The overall effect is to reduce the scope for EU activity. As one interviewee put it, it is not helpful to work within the EU first on initiatives, though coordination within the EU could happen at a later stage.
So at the HRC, many of the EU's member states have decided that the way they can be most effective is to work outside the EU. A large majority of EU member states are 'balancing' their EU identity with a stronger assertion of national actorness in the HRC. In both the Third Committee and HRC, past policy failures and a fear of future failures have put a brake on Europeanisation (on the effects of such external stimuli, see Alecu de Flers and Müller 2012, p. 30) .
Conclusions
The new institutions and decision-making procedures introduced by the Lisbon Treaty appear to have had a limited impact on the EU's activity in the UN's key intergovernmental human rights bodies, the General Assembly's Third Committee and the Human Rights Council. The level of EU activity has not changed much: the EU is issuing a steadily increasing number of statements in the Third Committee but about the same number in the HRC, and it sponsors the same number of resolutions on the same topics in both bodies. In the Third Committee, where the EU delegation has a stronger role than in the HRC, more member states are issuing more statements. At the HRC, there has been a significant increase in activity by member states acting outside the EU, on an individual basis or in cross-regional or other groups.
These findings contribute to the literature on Europeanisation in the field of EU foreign policy cooperation. Firstly, the process of Europeanisation does not always proceed clearly towards more convergence. What can be observed at the UN is not exactly a process of 'de-Europeanisation' (Hill and Wong 2011, p. 218) as the member states have not generally reduced EU activity or defected from existing EU positions. Instead it can be seen as a case of 'arrested Europeanisation'.
Member states are clearly still keen to protect their autonomy and capacity to act on a national basis.
Second, the external context matters. The reasons why the member states are intent on acting outside the EU in the HRC are to be found both in dissatisfaction or frustration with 'internal' EU processes and institutions (too slow, too difficult to find agreement, and so on) and in awareness of the constraints and opportunities of the external UN context. Most member states want to influence debates and outcomes in the HRC, and thus they act outside the EU, because acting within the EU is ineffective due to the dynamics of group politics at the UN. Rather than using the EU as an 'institutional repository of the second-order normative concerns' (Hyde-Price 2008, p. 31), such as human rights, member states are acting individually to pursue their normative goals in the HRC. If there is more cross-regional coalition-building in the Third Committee in the future, then it is likely that we will see EU member states acting more outside the EU context -despite the EU delegation's enhanced role there.
Third, the lessons of the external context are paradoxical for the EU. On the one hand, in an increasingly multipolar, interconnected world, size matters, and the EU member states would surely benefit from the 'politics of scale' (Ginsberg 1989) if they acted collectively. On the other hand, acting collectively in the microcosm of UN human rights bodies backfires precisely because the EU is not quite big enough (EU member states can easily be outvoted) and has struggled to gather enough supporters to win debates and outcomes. This tension between the imperatives of collective action in the wider international system and the imperative not to act as a bloc in the UN is likely to persist for some time and complicate any process of convergence on foreign policy issues.
Finally, the article contributes to our understanding of the impact that institutionalisation can have in an intergovernmental framework: member states still protect their capacity and freedom to act outside the EU, and they can 'box in' stronger central institutions so that they contribute to or take over policy-making only in prescribed areas. The member states agreed to create the institutions in the first place, but are clearly not keen to allow the institutions to take on much of 'a life of their own' -yet, at least. These findings do not bode well for the capacity of the EEAS or the High Representative to provide dynamic leadership in the future: without 'buy-in' by the member states (for example, through uploading preferences), the new institutions can do little but follow the paths already paved.
